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Tactically Tempting but Strategically Flawed
Gabriel Collins
As the noose tightens on a state’s economy, the victim may pursue a 
highly risky course of action—such as Germany’s decision to resume 
unrestricted submarine warfare or Japan’s decision to attack Pearl  
Harbor—that it otherwise may not have hazarded. . . . [H]istorical  
experience suggests that embargoes may include actions or reactions 
that are neither orderly nor predictable and that they are not simple, 
safe, and controllable substitutes for war.
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A MARITIME OIL BLOCKADE AGAINST CHINA
 On their own, energy embargoes are not a stand-in for strategy, nor are they an effective substitute for war�1 With a long-term trend of rising U�S�-China 
tensions and China’s growing dependence on imported crude oil to underpin its 
economic growth, distant energy blockades have received significant attention 
as potential tools for deterring, coercing, or terminating conflict with China�2 
Significant discussion of the energy blockade issue over the past decade likely 
was stimulated by a 2008 analysis by Gabriel B� Collins and William S� Murray 
(“No Oil for the Lamps of China?”)�3 “No Oil” argued that, at a fundamental 
level, a maritime oil blockade would create significant political, economic, and 
diplomatic collateral consequences, and thus would be unfit as a stand-alone 
campaign strategy in a conflict with China�
Subsequent analyses typically either focused 
primarily on addressing predominantly tactical 
and operational issues or, in some cases, argued 
that the concerns raised in “No Oil” would be 
deemed secondary during a military conflict 
between China and the United States�4 Yet the 
political, economic, and financial aspects of sus-
taining a unilateral—or perhaps bilateral, if not 
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alliance-based—oil blockade against China mean that even a militarily successful 
blockader could find its political, economic, and diplomatic position rendered 
untenable well before a blockade could exert its full effects�5 Neutral countries as 
well as U�S� allies would pressure Beijing and Washington strongly to end the con-
flict quickly, even in a distant-blockade scenario that focused on oil alone�6 The 
pressure likely would be exponentially stronger in scenarios in which Chinese 
maritime trade was interdicted more broadly, which likely would be the actual 
case� Under either scenario, as the blockade wore on the U�S� position outside the 
military domain would weaken progressively—most likely at a rate that exceeded 
the speed at which the blockade was pushing China toward termination of the 
conflict� This article aims to fill a critical gap by examining in greater detail the 
nonmilitary means that China likely would employ in response to a maritime oil 
blockade and these approaches’ strategic effects�
While the U�S� military almost certainly can execute the blockade mission 
against the People’s Republic of China (PRC), adverse political and economic 
dynamics likely would turn tactical success into a strategic outcome that, at best, 
would be muddled� Energy and resource blockades clearly would be a critical 
complement to a comprehensive, long-term war effort, and significant concep-
tual and planning work must be dedicated to the subject� But taking a tool that is 
fundamentally about slowly grinding an adversary down and trying to convert it 
into a substitute for head-on military conflict would be a risky strategy� It could 
make regional allies and China question U�S� resolve; it could allow service lead-
ers and civilian politicians to “punt” on important procurement commitments 
that are necessary to ensure credible combat capabilities in the face of China’s 
rising antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities; and it could lull the American 
public into thinking that there are relatively low-cost ways to resolve a military 
conflict with China victoriously—a combination that would be extremely un-
likely in practice�
Great-power wars typically are won on the political and economic fronts, 
where the country with the greatest reservoir of political will and the largest eco-
nomic and industrial heft prevails�7 Yet the political will in the United States and 
other countries to accept the adverse impacts that globally disruptive physical 
trade warfare would generate should not be taken for granted� Disruptions would 
emanate both from the U�S�-led action and, very likely, from the Chinese retalia-
tory reactions� The political and social stamina necessary to endure an oil block-
ade’s global economic consequences, potentially for a multiyear period, likely 
would be among the most critical factors in determining whether a tactical mili-
tary success could be translated into a strategic victory that would help the United 
States maintain its preeminent position in maritime East Asia� In grappling with 
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this issue, this analysis draws on a broad range of data and historical examples to 
illustrate the profound strategic risks and adverse consequences for the United 
States that likely would follow from imposing a maritime oil blockade on China�
Some of the analysts who responded to Collins and Murray’s 2008 work ex-
pressed remarkably glib opinions on the economic consequences of a U�S�-China 
conflict involving maritime blockades of energy supplies, other key raw materi-
als, and export goods� One analyst essentially dismissed the grave economic 
consequences of attacking a critical node of the global economy and the attendant 
—and unpredictable—diplomatic and political pressures this would create, not-
ing that destructive economic shock waves are “a given in any war between the 
United States and China�”8 Another posited that the world trade system could be 
rebuilt in a manner that excludes China, asserting that “[t]he U�S� geographic po-
sition and maritime nature of global trade [mean] the rest of the world economy 
could rebuild around the perimeter�”9
Such views risk creating a dangerous sense of strategic complacency� China’s 
economy is not the equivalent of a discrete brick that could be pulled out of the 
global trading architecture and simply replaced or rebuilt around quickly� Rather, 
the trade flows that are viewed as strategic vulnerabilities also reflect complicated 
international supply chains and manufacturing ecosystems that took decades to 
develop—and to which China is central and critical�
To put the matter into historical context, China today plays a significantly 
more important role in the global economy than Germany did on the eve of 
World War I� Imperial Germany accounted for slightly under 15 percent of 
global manufacturing production in 1913, while China now accounts for more 
than 25 percent of global manufacturing value added, within a much larger and 
more deeply interconnected global economy�10 Rewiring global industrial chains 
to offset meaningfully the loss of full Chinese participation would take years at 
best, and might not even be possible� A prolonged global economic output loss of 
a magnitude at least equal to that of the 2008–2009 Great Recession—if not the 
Great Depression itself—would become conceivable under such circumstances�
Arguably, strategic thought on the option of blockading oil shipments to Chi-
na has been distorted by prior U�S� economic-warfare campaigns against smaller 
countries� Such embargoes—particularly against Iran—damaged the target coun-
try sufficiently that Washington could declare “victory,” but avoided imposing 
systemic global costs high enough to alienate key U�S� allies and supporters� Eco-
nomic warfare against Iran is also a low-cost venture in the sense that—setting 
aside pinprick retaliation through its Middle Eastern proxies such as Hezbollah 
or Shia militias or isolated cyber attacks—Iran has relatively few attractive retalia-
tory options for inflicting serious strategic pressure on the United States� China, 
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in contrast, would have a range of credible military and nonmilitary options for 
retaliating against a U�S� energy blockade� 
Oil-based economic warfare against China would present challenges different 
from and much more complex than those pertaining to the economic and trade-
warfare campaigns the United States has waged over the past several decades� 
First, the community of trading nations—many of which chafed under the U�S� 
embargo against Iran—likely would be far less willing to tolerate actions against 
China that would harm their own economies deeply, with the pain of such harm 
increasing the longer the blockade continued� Reactions from countries fed up 
with U�S� action against China could unfold in numerous ways, including deny-
ing overflight rights and port and airfield access, severing trade relationships 
with U�S� companies, and refusing to cooperate with potential U�S� sanctions 
against China�
Second, China’s economic weight means that, unlike a country such as Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, or Syria, it cannot be cut off from the global 
economy with relatively little systemic consequence� An enduring lesson of past 
U�S� military actions abroad is that we are at our most powerful when we act with 
a critical mass of like-minded nations supporting us and facilitating the trans-
lation of national wealth into combat power� Unless China conducted a Pearl 
Harbor–style first strike, the United States likely would find it very difficult to 
line up sufficient international support for—or at least extended tolerance of—an 
economically destructive maritime oil blockade against China that likely would 
need to last for twelve months or longer to have full strategic effect� The global 
economic injury incurred simply would far outweigh the upside of supporting a 
prolonged campaign whose genesis most likely would come from a highly local 
miscalculation in a place such as the East or South China Sea, where the conflict 
is bilateral but the consequences would reverberate globally�
Third, China has multiple supply-side and demand-side options for buying 
itself strategic space and time to cope with a cutoff of seaborne oil and refined-
products imports� Its crude-oil inventories now likely exceed six hundred million 
barrels, equal to roughly a hundred days’ worth of seaborne crude-oil imports�11 
Despite China’s growing absolute and relative dependency on imported crude 
oil, it also remains one of the world’s largest producers, pumping more than 3�5 
million barrels per day (bpd) from its own fields� With Kazakh and Russian as-
sistance, it also likely could surge secure overland crude-oil imports by several 
hundred thousand barrels per day on relatively short notice� These additional 
supplies from Kazakhstan and Russia would not be sufficient to offset fully a loss 
of maritime supplies, but could help stretch the life of existing crude stockpiles� 
China also can ration demand and use domestically produced fuel substitutes 
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such as coal-based methanol to extend gasoline supplies and reduce crude-oil 
demand� This article will explore each of these potential responses in depth�
Fourth, past history in the Asia-Pacific region suggests that a successful U�S� 
embargo of oil shipments to a strong military power may escalate conflict in 
unpredictable ways� The U�S� decision to cut off oil shipments to Japan in the 
summer of 1941 helped trigger Japan’s invasion of the oil-rich Dutch East Indies, 
and arguably precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor� It is dangerous to assume 
that economic pressure would be more likely to push China’s leadership toward 
capitulation than escalation� Nationalism is a potent force in today’s China, and 
if an outside power attempted to blockade China’s seaborne oil supplies, the Chi-
nese public would likely call for a strong military response and other escalatory 
measures� Furthermore, many of the potential flash points at which a military 
confrontation could be precipitated between the United States and China— 
arising from various territorial and resource disputes in the East and South 
China Seas—involve matters that are disproportionally important to China and 
positions for which Beijing enjoys strong domestic support� Even objectively in-
flammatory measures, such as turning reefs into military outposts, are applauded 
widely by the Chinese body politic, and coercive measures by Washington in 
response to such actions would allow Beijing to portray itself as a victim of for-
eign aggression against China’s assertion of its perceived interests� Framing the 
narrative in this way could help maintain domestic political cohesion and brace 
Chinese society for a potentially prolonged and economically damaging conflict�
The disproportionate importance of fundamentally local conflicts also strong-
ly suggests that, rather than creating off-ramps for escalation control and conflict 
termination, an approach fundamentally based on a distant oil blockade instead 
might lead Chinese leaders to escalate and put the United States in a position 
from which it must either concede to China’s actions or amplify its military and 
political response into a higher-intensity conflict�
Fifth, the effects of suddenly removing more than five million barrels per day 
of demand from the global oil market and cutting off Chinese access to other sea-
borne resource imports likely would send commodity prices into a tailspin and 
cause severe economic disruptions to commodity exporters in the Middle East 
and other regions� Economic damage of sufficient scale could translate rapidly 
into social and political upheaval in an already-volatile region—where, it bears 
noting, it ultimately is U�S� military power that underpins the regional security 
architecture�
China’s global economic heft, other countries’ unhappiness with being sub-
jected to the collateral consequences of a U�S�-China conflict, and the risk of seri-
ous problems for key commodity exporters likely would put the United States in a 
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race against time to force Chinese capitulation before limited reserves of external 
political support were depleted�12 Assuming the United States sought substantive 
Chinese capitulation, such time pressure would undermine a central motivation 
for using a distant oil blockade: escalation control through the ability to impose 
economic pain in a calibrated manner� 
The often-underappreciated adverse consequences do not mean that a distant 
energy blockade lacks strategic viability� Rather, they suggest that policy makers 
considering maritime embargoes or so-called offshore control should recognize 
that, while the United States might have the tactical capability to seal off China’s 
maritime oil arteries, blockades alone are a limited means to a limited end� As 
has been argued previously, “effective blockades typically take years to achieve 
their goals and even then succeed only when they are a part of a comprehensive 
military action that usually includes invasion or massive aerial bombardment�”13 
Blockade advocates must consider the strategy’s inherent limitations, as well as 
the full range of potential adverse consequences for American strategic objec-
tives� Otherwise, they risk setting the United States up for a Pyrrhic victory—or 
worse�
U.S. ABILITY TO INTERDICT CHINA’S SEABORNE OIL TRADE
China’s reliance on seaborne oil supplies has risen steadily over the past decade 
and could rise further as domestic production declines�14 The country’s oil- 
demand growth rate has slowed dramatically, registering only a 2�5 percent 
increase in 2016� Nonetheless, demand growth now occurs atop a large base 
(nearly twelve million barrels per day), so even a 2 percent demand growth rate 
still would mean consumption of oil products expanding by 240 thousand barrels 
per day (kbd)� Furthermore, the current oil price downturn has pressured China’s 
domestic oil output, which declined by 7 percent year over year in 2016 and is 
poised for further declines in 2017, barring a major recovery in oil prices�15
Moreover, the imported oil passes overwhelmingly through the Strait of Ma-
lacca and a handful of other passages that the U�S� Navy could seal off effectively 
(see figure 1)�16 Under normal peacetime conditions, the Malacca Strait is the 
dominant waterway for transit of oil shipments; it carried an estimated 16�0 
million bpd of crude oil and petroleum products in 2016, the most recent year 
for which official Energy Information Administration data are available�17 The 
largest tankers use the deeper Lombok Strait, since their draft plus the under-
hull clearance required for safe passage exceeds the twenty-five-meter depth the 
Malacca offers�18
Additionally, a distant blockade would be imposed far from the Chinese 
coast, reducing the threat to U�S� forces from Chinese A2/AD systems� The most 
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important Asian inbound oil tanker routes are the Strait of Malacca and Lombok 
Strait for crudes originating in Africa and the Middle East, and the western Pa­
cific passage between the Philippines and Japan for cargoes coming from North 
and South America.
A distant blockade also would need to interdict the Myanmar–China oil pipe­
line, which eventually could move as much as 440 kbd of crude oil from Kyauk­
pyu in coastal Myanmar to Yunnan Province in southwest China.19 Preventing 
tankers from off­loading at the Kyaukpyu terminal would require few, if any, 
naval platforms to remain on­site. The area could be declared an exclusion zone 
FIGURE 1
KEY PASSAGES FOR SEABORNE CRUDE OIL HEADED TO CHINA
Source: Google Earth, author’s analysis.
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for the duration of a conflict, and if the Myanmar authorities failed to comply the 
facility could be disabled via air strikes, aerial mining, or other kinetic action�20 
In short, U�S� forces likely would be able to neutralize rapidly China’s overland 
routes for seaborne oil imports to avoid the Strait of Malacca and other choke 
points farther east and prevent them from diverting forces needed to seal other 
maritime ingress routes�
Differentiating among Targets in a Crowded Maritime Landscape
A large portion of China’s inbound oil trade would be readily targetable because it 
is carried on PRC-flagged vessels owned by PRC-domiciled shipping companies 
or their subsidiaries�21 Vessels operated by or for China’s large, state-owned oil-
trading companies, such as UNIPEC—which has ranked consistently as one of 
the world’s largest supertanker charterers over the past several years—also would 
be readily identifiable�22 Moreover, because a PRC entity would be the clear fi-
nancial beneficiary of trade conducted with such vessels regardless of the stated 
cargo destination, they almost certainly would be seized or turned away if they 
entered a blockade zone�
Yet even after sifting out the “obviously PRC” target set, naval planners would 
face the challenging question of how to permit oil to continue flowing to regional 
U�S� allies “behind the blockade” while also preventing leakage of oil to the PRC� 
Oil cargoes can be traded while still at sea in a tanker, creating an opportunity for 
potential blockade-runners to obscure the cargo’s ultimate destination�23 This is 
a strategically important consideration, because smart blockaders typically aim 
to minimize disruption to shipping between neutral countries so as to maximize 
political support for—or, at a minimum, tolerance of—the blockade�
A specially tailored version of the “navicert” system that Britain used dur-
ing World Wars I and II offers a possible solution�24 In the system’s original 
form, a shipper applied to the British government for approval to ship goods 
to a particular country� Then, after investigating the cargo, its destination, in-
surers, and parties that stood to benefit financially from the shipment, British 
authorities granted an approved shipment a navicert, which functioned as a 
“commercial passport” that allowed the vessel to pass through the Royal Navy 
(RN) blockade�25 A vessel without a navicert was treated as a blockade-runner 
and was subject to seizure� Today, a vessel also might be required to place a U�S� 
government–controlled tracking beacon on board as a precondition for being 
granted a navicert in such a system�26
In the case of a hypothetical distant oil blockade, secure digital navicerts could 
be issued for carriage of oil and refined products into Asian ports east and north 
of Singapore� To tighten the blockade, the United States could combine navicerts 
and “forcible rationing�”27 In essence, forcible rationing entails allotting a fixed 
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quantity of crude oil (and possibly refined products) to neutral markets behind 
the blockade cordon� The quota would be based on the neutral countries’ actual 
demands, to create a situation in which a neutral country’s reexports to China 
would create shortages and hardship in that market, thus setting up a self-enforcing 
compliance mechanism that creates disincentives to transship crude oil or refined 
products or both onward to China in violation of a blockade� If consumers in a 
specific neutral market were found to be reducing their fuel use and shipping the 
remainder onward to China in response to high-price offers from Chinese trad-
ers desperate for fuel, quotas could be adjusted downward accordingly�
There are approximately thirty large (i�e�, 100 kbd or larger distillation capac-
ity) oil refineries in East Asia outside of China that lie behind a likely distant-
blockade perimeter, most of which are in Japan and South Korea (see figure 2)� 
U�S� regulators could attach destination clauses to navicerts that prevented the 
resale of crude once tankers passed the distant-blockade force and could en-
force these by requiring certified shippers to report vessel locations in real time 
and surveilling activity at oil wharves at regional refineries and storage depots� 
Given that Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan likely would have inter-
ests broadly aligned with those of the United States during a conflict with the 
PRC, the United States also could station expert observers at each large regional 
refinery to track distribution of crude oil and petroleum products to ensure that 
supplies were not diverted to China�28 Refineries in Indonesia and Malaysia could 
prove more complex, perhaps requiring additional tracking and verification mea-
sures, such as aerial surveillance of ship traffic to and from the facilities�
These plants’ combined daily crude-processing capacity is approximately 6�8 
million bpd� Since most oil would be arriving over long-haul routes in large tank-
ers, this would keep inbound ship volumes manageable: three to four very large 
crude carriers per day, or approximately ten smaller Aframax vessels, if ship-
ments were moved that way� The certified-shipper system could be replicated for 
vessels carrying refined products such as diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel�29
Handling Noncompliant Vessels
If a vessel were to violate the terms of the navicert, tamper with the permit or 
the tracking systems, or otherwise engage in behavior suggestive of an intent 
to violate the blockade, consequences could come in two fundamental forms� 
First, military forces in the blockade cordon could employ disabling fire� As Sean 
Mirski points out, several high-profile sinkings or disablings likely would have a 
strong deterrent effect on future prospective blockade-runners�30
The second, preferable method would occur at the “back end” of the navicert 
regime� Namely, geographic factors and draft restrictions constrain the passage of 
large tankers between China and large overseas oil suppliers, limiting them to no 
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more than six straits and passes between islands in the so-called first island chain 
(the Pacific Ocean between Japan and the Philippines)� Generally, after such 
Facility Country Capacity (kbd)
JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Mizushima) Japan  380
JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Negishi) Japan  270
TonenGeneral (Kawasaki) Japan  258
Showa Yokkaichi (Yokkaichi) Japan  255
Kashima (Kashima) Japan  253
Cosmo (Chiba) Japan  220
Idemitsu (Chiba) Japan  200
Idemitsu (Aichi) Japan  175
Idemitsu (Hokkaido) Japan  160
TonenGeneral (Sakai) Japan  156
Kyokuto (Chiba) Japan  152
JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Sendai) Japan  145
Fuji (Sodegaura) Japan  143
JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Oita) Japan  136
Cosmo (Yokkaichi) Japan  132
TonenGeneral (Wakayama) Japan  132
JX Nippon Oil & Energy (Marifu) Japan  127
Seibu (Yamaguchi) Japan  120
Taiyo (Shikoku) Japan  118
Osaka International Refining Company (Osaka) Japan  115
Cosmo (Sakai) Japan  100
Nansei (Nishihara) Japan  100
Toa (Keihin) Japan  70
 Japan subtotal 3,917
SK Energy (Ulsan) South Korea  817
GS Caltex (Yosu) South Korea  750
S-Oil (Onsan) South Korea  565
SK Energy (Inchon) South Korea  275
Hyundai (Daesan) South Korea  275
 South Korea subtotal 2,682
Petron (Bataan) Philippines  180
 Philippines subtotal  180
 Grand total 6,779
FIGURE 2
KEY NON-PRC EAST ASIAN OIL REFINERIES
Note: kbd = thousand barrels per day.
Sources: “Location of Refineries and Crude Distillation Capacity in Japan (as of June 2015),” PAJ, www.paj.gr.jp/; “About Bataan Refinery,” Petron, www 
.petron.com/; “Overview of SK Energy’s Petroleum Business,” SK Energy, eng.skenergy.com/; “Refining Facilities,” GS Caltex, www.gscaltex 
.com/; “Oil Refining Business,” S-Oil, www.s-oil.com/; “Overview,” Hyundai Oilbank, www.oilbank.co.kr/; “Overview,” SK Incheon Petroleum, eng 
.skincheonpetrochem.com/.
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ships off-load crude oil in China they eventually have to pass back through the 
distant blockade stations if they are to obtain additional crude oil� Any outbound 
ship that (1) lacked a navicert, or (2) could not provide beacon tracking data that 
corroborated its compliance with the issued navicert, or (3) had attempted to 
off-load crude at sea to a China-bound vessel would be presumed to have run the 
blockade and could be seized or sunk� Conducting outbound screening activities 
would have the advantage of allowing naval forces to operate beyond the most 
dense—and thus most dangerous—coverage of China’s A2/AD systems�
CHINA’S NONMILITARY RESPONSES: BUYING TIME
One of this article’s primary contributions is its examination of China’s nonmili-
tary options for responding to a loss of seaborne oil supplies� China has various 
options for offsetting a loss of seaborne crude oil and refined-product supplies� 
The potential responses span a range of time and cost dimensions�
China’s initial nonmilitary responses to a distant oil-and-refined-products 
blockade likely would emphasize two core elements: (1) minimizing domestic oil 
demand to extend the life of commercial and strategic crude-oil stocks, and (2) 
maximizing nonmaritime liquid-fuel supplies by working to augment overland 
imports of crude oil and refined products, as well as blending domestically pro-
duced “extenders” such as coal-derived methanol into the gasoline and diesel-fuel 
pools to reduce the demand for crude oil� The intent would be to maintain the 
ability to fuel the military and to support as much civilian economic activity as 
possible, with the ultimate goal of holding out long enough for the U�S� politi-
cal will to sustain the conflict to wane, potentially opening the door for a peace 
settlement more favorable to Chinese interests�
Demand-Side Options
Conservation through rationing would be among the lowest-cost and fastest 
responses to a seaborne energy embargo� The experience of the United States 
during World War II offers perhaps the most applicable case study for assessing 
potential parameters for rationing in China� The America of that era was—just 
as contemporary China is—a world-class industrial power that was heavily 
mechanized, and for which petroleum was an irreplaceable strategic economic 
input�31 Between 1941 and 1944, the United States used a mix of voluntary and 
compulsory measures to decrease private and commercial highway gasoline 
consumption (i�e�, transportation-driven gasoline demand) by 32 percent�32 As 
transportation expert Bradley Flamm points out, the U�S� achievement was espe-
cially noteworthy because it occurred “at a time when population, employment, 
and income growth would normally have led to large increases in auto ownership 
and gasoline consumption�”33
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China remains in a period of similarly dynamic growth in personal car owner-
ship� Yet there are important differences that credibly suggest that China could 
reduce motor-fuel demand more rapidly than the United States did during World 
War II, and perhaps circumscribe demand even more severely if circumstances 
warranted� First, by 1940 the United States already had more than two hundred 
private cars per thousand persons—approximately twice the current ownership 
rate in China�34 Second, many Chinese still use public transit as their primary 
mode of transportation to work and for daily activities, so a move to curtail auto 
use likely would spark less resistance than it did in the United States, where the 
government faced stiff pushback from many car owners who chafed at gasoline-
supply restrictions� Third, Chinese car owners in key markets, including Beijing, 
already regularly face serious restrictions on their driving—for instance, via 
administrative decrees that only cars with even- or odd-numbered license plates 
can be used on certain days�35
So what would it mean in concrete terms if China responded to a seaborne oil 
and products embargo by imposing rationing that reduced gasoline demand by 
a third relative to preblockade levels? The International Energy Agency forecast 
that China’s gasoline demand in 2017 would be approximately 3 million bpd�36 
Thus, a 33 percent reduction in gasoline use—a million barrels per day—would 
decrease China’s total estimated oil products demand by more than 8 percent�
Oil demand likely would decline further as economic activity slowed because 
of the blockade and as civilian consumption of diesel and middle-distillate fuels 
(which are critical to air and naval operations) fell� “Involuntary” rationing likely 
would accelerate as export-oriented factories shut down and trucking activity fell� 
This article’s analysis suggests that the average heavy truck in China consumes 
approximately 144 barrels of diesel fuel per year�37 Under such conditions, idling 
5 percent of the Chinese heavy-truck fleet—a plausible and conservative projec-
tion for the likely effects of an oil blockade—would remove a diesel-demand vol-
ume equivalent to the entire daily consumption of the Shanghai municipality— 
approximately 112 kbd�
Rationing also would facilitate the redirection of fuels to the Chinese military 
and critical internal-transport activities� Even during the peak of U�S� military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and “normal” training activities and force 
movements, the Defense Department’s daily average fuel use was nearly four 
hundred thousand barrels per day—an amount equal to slightly more than 10 
percent of China’s domestic crude-oil output�38 Even if some fuel use was not in-
cluded in this figure—for instance, that by transport aircraft and ships transiting 
multiple countries to support operations—it still strongly suggests that China’s 
domestic crude supplies alone would be more than sufficient to fuel the country’s 
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military operations for a very long period, particularly since the PLA does not 
face the “tyranny of distance” and the fuel-use intensity it causes to nearly the de-
gree that forward-based U�S� forces would� Furthermore, China’s rapidly growing 
domestic air-travel market likely would cease to operate during a conflict, ow-
ing both to reduced travel activity and to the need to reroute domestic kerosene 
consumption—now nearing seven hundred thousand barrels per day—to sup-
port military activities�
Finally, the domestic rail system, which moved 13 percent of the country’s 
freight volume in 2015 (as opposed to the 32 percent of freight volume that 
moved by highway), also likely would receive priority fuel allocations� Rail is 
a high-volume coal mover in China, and would become more important if a 
blockading power threatened the coastwise coal shipping that currently moves 
several hundred million tons of the fuel per year from northern to southern Chi-
nese ports� Railroads are highly fuel efficient� Indeed, based on the estimates in 
the previous paragraph and fuel-efficiency data from the Union Pacific (UP) and 
BNSF railroads, shutting down 5 percent of China’s heavy-truck fleet potentially 
would free up middle-distillate fuel sufficient to move roughly 1�5 trillion ton-
miles of goods�39 This volume would be equivalent to 13 percent of all freight 
goods transported in China during 2015, according to data from the National 
Bureau of Statistics�40
Supply-Side Options
Rationing and other conservation activities would set the stage for China’s core 
supply-side response to a disruption in the supply of oil and refined products 
caused by a blockade: tapping strategic and commercial stockpiles� As the coun-
try drew down crude-oil and petroleum-products inventories, it also would 
redouble efforts to procure additional supplies via pipeline, rail, and truck from 
Kazakhstan and Russia�41 These two overland supplier countries are China’s “stra-
tegic depth,” from an oil-security perspective� They have significant supplies of 
crude and the ability to increase flows to China fairly rapidly, and likely would 
have abundant diplomatic and geostrategic reasons in the event of a maritime 
oil blockade to scale up overland oil supplies to China, quietly but significantly� 
Once scale-up occurred and infrastructure kinks were ironed out, these increased 
supplies—one could call them the “Oil Silk Road”—likely could be sustained for 
years and could undermine a blockade meaningfully by extending the time an 
adversary would have to sustain it�
The Atasu–A-la Shan-k’ou (Alashankou) pipeline that brings Kazakh and 
some Russian crude into Xinjiang currently has a capacity of twenty million tons 
per year—approximately four hundred thousand barrels per day�42 Since early 
2014, the line has operated below capacity, and as of October 2017 it delivered 
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only about fifty thousand barrels per day, suggesting that the line currently has 
approximately 350 kbd of “headroom” if supplies needed to be surged in the event 
of a seaborne energy embargo�43
From Russia, the first Skovorodino–Daqing crude-oil pipeline entered service 
in 2010 and now can deliver a maximum supply of four hundred thousand bar-
rels per day�44 Transneft and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
are now in the final stages of building a parallel pipeline from Skovorodino to 
Daqing that would expand the system capacity to six hundred thousand barrels 
per day; it is slated to enter service in 2018�45 In April 2017, CNPC also put the 
440 kbd–capacity Myanmar–China oil pipeline into operation, but this system 
should not be considered a “secure” source of supply the way Kazakh and Russian 
pipelines are, because, as discussed above, it is highly vulnerable to naval inter-
diction, especially if a conflict escalated�46
In the event of a blockade, Chinese traders also likely would move rapidly to 
secure supplies via rail� Prior to the construction of the Skovorodino–Daqing 
pipeline spur, Russian producers delivered as much as 228 kbd of crude by rail 
into China�47 The ultimate surge capacity during a crisis would depend primar-
ily on three factors: (1) congestion on key Siberian rail routes between the west 
Siberian oil fields and the Chinese and Kazakh borders, (2) the availability of 
tank cars on each side of the border, and (3) the speed with which Russian and 
Chinese rail operators could calibrate their train cycle times to maximize rolling 
stock use� GlobalTrans, one of Russia’s primary freight-rail operators, reported at 
the end of 2016 that the country had a total of 260,000 operational tank cars�48 To 
put that number in perspective, the United States had 371,000 operational tank 
cars at the end of 2014, at which point railroads were moving more than 950 kbd 
of crude within U�S� borders�49
From mid-2012 to spring 2013, U�S� railroads more than doubled their crude-
oil haulage volume as coastal refiners demanded crudes from burgeoning shale 
plays�50 The scale-up rate and total haul volume were facilitated by the high ef-
ficiency of the U�S� freight rail network and the fact that even the distant Bakken 
oil fields in western North Dakota were never more than about 2,400 km from 
end-user markets� In contrast, a crude measurement on Google Earth suggests 
that the rail distance from Russia’s core oil fields in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous 
Okrug to the main ingress point for rail-borne crude at Manzhouli, Inner Mon-
golia, is nearly four thousand kilometers each way� Given these numbers, even a 
full mobilization of Russian crude by rail hauling apparatus likely would not be 
able to deliver more than perhaps four hundred thousand barrels per day sus-
tainably, with an additional one hundred thousand barrels per day coming from 
Kazakhstan (see figure 3)� These volumes would be helpful—but they are not 
blockade breakers by any means�
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Expanding Pipeline Capacity from Russia. Transneft’s eastern Siberia–Pacific 
Ocean (ESPO) pipeline currently can transport fifty-eight million tons (roughly 1 
million bpd) of crude oil per year from Tayshet to Skovorodino, which is the start 
point of the southbound pipeline system into the Daqing area.51 The pipeline 
spur into China currently can transport approximately four hundred thousand 
barrels of crude per day and is expected to be capable of moving six hundred 
thousand barrels per day once a parallel pipeline whose construction was com-
pleted in November 2017 enters service in early 2018.52 
Those numbers suggest that if the first stage of the ESPO from Tayshet to 
Skovorodino were to run at full capacity under current parameters, there would 
be an additional four hundred thousand barrels of oil available per day once the 
pipelines into China were running at full utilization. Transneft plans to expand 
the ESPO’s capacity to eighty million tons per year (1.6 million bpd) by 2020.53 
Taking this full-capacity number and subtracting the anticipated amount slated 
to head into China (six hundred thousand barrels per day) suggests that as much 
as one million barrels per day could be available if an exigent situation led Rus-
sian firms to breach contracts for seaborne supplies through the port of Kozmino 
and instead make oil available to supply China. The big question is how so much 
oil could be moved in a timely manner. As outlined above, rail and truck will play 
a key role initially. However, another option exists that has not received much, 
if any, consideration to date: building additional southbound pipeline capacity.
Atasu–A-la Shan-k’ou
Oil Pipeline (400 kbd).
Myanmar–China Oil Pipeline (400 kbd).
Access likely to be denied.
Tayshet–Skovorodino Oil Pipeline (1,600 
kbd by 2020).
Cross-border capacity of 400 kbd at the time 
of writing; 600 kbd projected by the rst 
quarter of 2018.
Wartime emergency could see additional 
surge capacity of 700 kbd for a total of 1,300 
kbd post-2018 within eight months after 
commencement of conict.
Note:
Insucient cross-border infrastructure and lack of domestic 
oil supplies would largely prevent strategically signicant 
transshipment from Vietnam, Laos, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan into China. Political
factors likely to hinder potential supplies via Indian or 
Mongolian borders.
FIGURE 3
CHINA’S OVERLAND OIL SUPPLY OPTIONS
Note: kbd = thousand barrels per day.
Source: Google Earth, author’s analysis.
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China was able to build the initial Russia–China pipeline at an average rate of 
approximately 1�6 km per day, and has built crude-oil pipelines in western China 
at rates approaching 2�25 km per day�54 The Jinzhou–Zhengzhou oil-products line 
was welded at an average rate of 3�6 km per day�55 In a time of national emergency, 
pipelines could be built much more quickly, as builders likely would marshal a 
much larger share of their equipment and manpower for a select few “national 
priority” projects than would be the case under normal conditions�
Perhaps the closest historical analogy comes from the American construction 
of the “Big Inch” oil pipeline during World War II� The Big Inch enabled the 
secure overland movement of crude oil from Texas oil fields to East Coast refin-
eries� Oil formerly had been moved from the Gulf of Mexico in coastwise tank-
ers, but German submarine attacks jeopardized this maritime supply line and 
forced the United States to find alternative routes� At 1,254 miles (two thousand 
kilometers) long, the Big Inch covered roughly twice the distance a line from the 
Russian border to Daqing would, and construction crews managed to complete 
it in just 350 days—an average construction rate of nearly six kilometers per 
day�56 Therefore, it is not inconceivable that a thousand-kilometer pipeline from 
Russia capable of moving several—perhaps as many as seven to eight—hundred 
thousand barrels of crude oil per day into the Daqing area could be built within 
six months�57
If rationing, demand substitution, and overland supply measures were com-
bined with a pipeline that could be brought on line within six months of the 
conflict’s commencement, the effects on China’s ability to withstand a maritime 
oil blockade could be profound� Because Transneft’s eastbound pipelines are now 
linked to fields in eastern Siberia and Russia’s core west Siberian producing areas, 
crude supplies could be sustained for a long period and the infrastructure would 
be located far inland, where it could be struck only at significant risk to the at-
tacker’s forces and with a high risk of escalation�
Use of “Fuel Extenders.” Chinese fuel providers could blend methanol produced 
from abundant domestic coal reserves into the country’s gasoline and diesel fuel 
supplies as a way to replace some degree of seaborne crude-oil imports lost to a 
blockade� The focus is on methanol as a fuel extender because, unlike ethanol 
produced from corn and staple grains, methanol production does not consume 
essential human food supplies�
The fuel extenders would provide China with multiple strategic advantages� 
Methanol can be produced from the country’s abundant domestic coal supplies� 
Argus, a petroleum market data provider, estimates that by 2018 China will be 
able to produce approximately 120 million tons per year of methanol (equivalent 
to 2�6 million bpd), 80 percent of which is slated to come from coal feedstock 
and would be invulnerable to a maritime blockade, at least from a feedstock 
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perspective�58 However, China would need to be self-sufficient in the catalysts 
used to make methanol from coal; some of China’s largest coal-to-methanol 
plants currently source their catalysts from a key foreign-domiciled manufac-
turer that very likely would face significant pressure to curb Chinese customers’ 
access to catalysts during any conflict between China and the United States�59 It is 
currently unclear to what extent the Chinese coal-to-methanol industry depends 
on foreign-sourced catalysts�
Modern fuel-injected gasoline engines generally can tolerate a blend of 15 
percent methanol and 85 percent gasoline, also known as M15�60 At least sixteen 
Chinese provinces—including some of the country’s largest gasoline markets—
have promulgated local methanol-gasoline standards, and the country overall 
already blends approximately five hundred thousand barrels per day of methanol 
into its gasoline and motor-fuel pools, displacing the equivalent of 250 kbd of 
crude oil�61 At the end of 2015, China had an estimated 55 million tons per year 
(around 1,190 kbd) of domestic methanol-production capacity, according to 
market data provider Platts�62 China’s methanol-production capacity increased 
by 7�16 million tons per annum (tpa) in 2016, and is slated to rise by a further 7 
million tpa in 2017, bringing the total nameplate capacity to nearly 1,500 kbd�63 
Argus estimates that, counting captive supply for methanol-to-olefins plants, 
China’s total methanol-production capacity could be as much as 120 million tpa 
by 2020—roughly 2�6 million bpd�64 It is thus highly plausible that by early 2019 
China could have 2 million bpd of domestic methanol-production capacity�
Much of China’s domestic methanol supply currently is used to produce 
olefins—a feedstock for petrochemical and polymer production� It is very likely 
that during a blockade contingency the Chinese government would prioritize 
liquid-fuel availability over the manufacturing of polymers and petrochemicals, a 
significant portion of which go to export markets� Of a domestic methanol supply 
exceeding 2�5 million bpd, a substantial portion of the stream likely would be di-
verted into the gasoline/motor-fuel supply, to reduce the call on crude oil� (Here 
it should be noted that a gallon of methanol yields approximately 49 percent as 
much energy as a gallon of gasoline�)65
If Chinese policy makers chose to replace 15 percent of the refined blendstocks 
from crude oil in the country’s total gasoline pool with coal-derived methanol, 
this would suggest a requirement for approximately six hundred thousand bar-
rels per day of methanol�66 The country’s estimated 2018 domestic coal-based 
methanol-production capacity of roughly two million barrels per day would be 
able to accommodate this number, and in doing so would displace the energy 
equivalent of nearly three hundred thousand barrels per day of crude oil–derived 
products demand�67
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Tests by researchers in Australia and Iran have shown that a lightly modified 
common diesel engine could run successfully on a blend of diesel fuel and metha-
nol� The team tried mixes incorporating 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 percent 
methanol by volume and found that a 10 percent methanol / 90 percent diesel 
blend generally performed best in terms of delivering a usable torque curve, ad-
equate power, and reasonably efficient fuel consumption�68 However, the blend 
ratio likely would be pushed higher to maximize the reduction in crude-oil usage; 
therefore, this analysis uses 15 percent as the methanol-blend figure� With 2�25 
barrels of methanol as the energy equivalent of one barrel of diesel fuel, 725 kbd 
of methanol theoretically could meet 15 percent of China’s diesel-fuel demand 
volume (3�3 million bpd × 5 percent demand reduction × 15 percent of supply × 
2�25 = 724 kbd of methanol) and displace 320 kbd of crude oil–derived products 
consumption� Large-scale adoption of fuel extenders likely would create addi-
tional engine performance and maintenance issues above what Chinese drivers 
experience today, but a blockade-driven crisis scenario likely would make vehicle 
users willing to accept and adapt to such disruptions�
COMBINED MEASURES WOULD HELP CHINA MAXIMIZE  
PRESSURE ON THE BLOCKADER
Each additional month that China successfully endured a seaborne energy 
blockade would mean increased pressure on a blockading power to terminate 
the conflict� This analysis contemplates a scenario of conflict post-2018� The base 
scenario’s assumptions are as follows:
1� On the first day, China holds combined commercial and strategic 
crude-oil stocks of seven hundred million barrels in storage tanks and 
underground caverns�69
2� The country’s refinery runs of crude oil are 12�5 million bpd�
3� Rationing rapidly reduces demand for oil products by 35 percent relative 
to preconflict levels�
4� China imports a baseline volume of six hundred thousand barrels per day 
of crude from Russia and four hundred thousand barrels per day from 
Kazakhstan by pipeline�
5� The 440 kbd Myanmar–China pipeline is interdicted and unable to supply 
crude�
6� Russia and Kazakhstan surge railborne crude supplies by a combined 
total of four hundred thousand barrels per day�
7� In addition to pipeline and rail supplies, Russia and Kazkahstan provide 
150 kbd of crude overland, by truck�
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   66 2/23/18   10:51 AM
18
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/6
 C O L L I N S  6 7
8� Methanol blended into 
gasoline, vegetable oils 
blended into the diesel-
fuel supply, and other fuel 
extenders reduce crude-
oil demand by 615 kbd�
Under the baseline scenario, 
China’s crude-oil  stockpile 
would last for approximately ten 
months� If Chinese policy mak-
ers could reduce demand for oil 
products by 40 percent through 
rationing, import an additional 
one hundred thousand barrels 
per day of crude from Russia and Kazakhstan by rail and truck, and bring new 
pipelines capable of moving four hundred thousand barrels per day of Russian 
crude from Skovorodino within eight months of blockade imposition, the coun-
try’s stockpile “holdout time” would rise to seventeen months� For reference, 
it is unlikely that China’s direct military fuel needs would exceed five hundred 
thousand barrels per day even during an intense conflict�
Building a new pipeline from the Russian border capable of importing an 
additional six hundred thousand barrels per day of crude would increase the 
holdout time to twenty months in the 40 percent–rationing case� In a more 
extreme response scenario—maintaining all the above conditions but reducing 
crude-oil refinery runs by 45 percent from preconflict levels—the holdout time 
would be extended to more than four years� In the most optimistic response 
scenario—achieving 45 percent rationing reduction in oil-products demand and 
building additional pipeline capacity of eight hundred thousand barrels per day 
from eastern Siberia into northeast China—China would have nearly eight years 
before crude stockpiles ran out�
It is likely that even a conflict response that began with rationing less than 35 
percent relative to preconflict oil consumption soon would experience substan-
tial involuntary reductions as economic activity slowed� As China’s gross domes-
tic product and economic activity declined, the country likely would end up with 
ample domestic and overland liquid-fuel supplies to maintain basic activities, as 
discussed earlier� In addition, a multiyear-blockade scenario also likely would 
trigger even deeper structural adaptations� These likely would include greater 
use of public transport; greater use of railroads and internal waterways to move 
cargo instead of trucking it; cessation of most domestic passenger flights; and 
Beginning crude oil stocks, kbd 700,000
Baseline refinery runs, kbd  12,500
Refinery runs at 35% rationing, kbd  8,125
Refinery runs at 40% rationing, kbd  7,500
Refinery runs at 45% rationing, kbd  6,875
Methanol and fuel extenders, kbd  615
Domestic production, kbd  3,600
Pipeline supplies from Russia and Kazakhstan, kbd  1,000
Rail- and truck-borne supplies from Russia and 
Kazakhstan, kbd
 550




BASE ASSUMPTIONS FOR VARIOUS SCENARIOS
Note: kbd = thousand barrels per day.
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significant expansion of coal-
to-liquids production capacity, 
which currently is considered 
too environmentally damaging 
and economically uncompeti-
tive to justify funding� Here it 
bears noting that if all currently 
approved coal-to-liquids proj-
ects in China came on line, their 
total capacity would be 13�8 mil-
lion tons per year, equivalent to 
nearly three hundred thousand 
barrels per day of diesel fuel�70
While these scenario esti-
mates are relatively simplistic, 
they suggest that rationing 
would be the highest-impact 
response strategy for Chinese 
policy makers facing a blockade 
of seaborne crude-oil imports� 
Building additional pipelines to 
move additional Russian oil into 
northeast China and blending 
methanol and other fuel extend-
ers into the gasoline and diesel 
pools would be the next most 
impactful responses�
The scenarios also highlight the reality that, within historically realistic re-
sponse parameters, China very feasibly could adapt to conflict conditions and 
withstand a blockade for a longer period than an outside power realistically could 
sustain the operation� At the most fundamental level, a blockader would find 
itself increasingly isolated on the world stage, which would complicate its ability 
politically, economically, and militarily to continue its campaign�
In addition, unlike imperial Japan in World War II, whose military was crip-
pled by a seaborne oil blockade because the country had no meaningful domestic 
oil production, China’s domestic production and overland imports supply many 
times the daily oil requirements of even the most intense conceivable conflict 
scenarios�71 Therefore the People’s Liberation Army Air Force and Navy would 
not be constrained by fuel shortages, enabling them to project power against a 





No Emergency Pipeline from Russia
Initial crude-oil stockpile drawdown 
rate without seaborne imports and  
no rationing, kbd
–6,735  3
Draw rate with 35% demand  
rationing, kbd
–2,360 10
Draw rate with 40% demand  
rationing, kbd
 –1,735 13
Draw rate with 45% demand  
rationing, kbd
 –1,110 21
Emergency Pipeline from Russia  
Enters Service on Eighth Month of Blockade
Drawdown rate with no seaborne 
crude imports once supplementary  
emergency pipeline built  
(no rationing), kbd
–6,035  3
Draw rate with 35% demand  
rationing, kbd
–1,660 12
Draw rate with 40% demand 
rationing, kbd
 –1,035 21




CHINA’S CRUDE-OIL “HOLDOUT” TIMES UNDER 
VARIOUS SCENARIOS
Note: kbd = thousand barrels per day.
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chain in a manner that likely would force the United States ultimately either to 
escalate by engaging in direct military conflict closer to China or to forgo military 
action in China’s near neighborhood, effectively making China the new military 
hegemon in much of East and Southeast Asia�
CRITICAL STRATEGIC CHALLENGES TO A DISTANT  
OIL BLOCKADE
Risk of Systemic Global Disruptions
The commodity flow disruptions and price volatility that would accompany a 
distant blockade of China likely would be phenomenal� Sealing off the country’s 
maritime inbound oil arteries by itself rapidly would eliminate approximately 10 
percent of global oil demand, cratering prices in the process and setting the stage 
for multiple negative secondary effects in the Persian Gulf region and others de-
pendent on oil-export revenues� The effects would worsen as a blockade ground 
on, disrupting regional and global supply chains and almost certainly prompting 
demand rationing within China itself� A reduction in global crude-oil demand 
on the order of eight to ten million barrels per day within months of a blockade 
being imposed is not inconceivable� To put that figure in perspective, the global 
surplus during the deepest phase of the 2014–16 global oil price crash was only 
about two million barrels per day, and prices still fell below thirty dollars per 
barrel at one point—likely less than half the price that Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
and other major exporters need to balance their budgets and maintain long-term 
financial and political stability�72
To try to achieve a timely rebalancing of the global oil market under such con-
ditions, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) would 
be forced to make dramatic cuts in production volumes� During the 2008–2009 
oil price collapse, OPEC moved decisively to reduce production, and by the end 
of 2008 had agreed to cuts that reduced total daily global oil supplies by nearly 5 
percent (more than four million barrels per day)�73 The results were substantial: 
oil prices that bottomed in February 2009 nearly doubled by the end of that year�74 
But a blockade scenario likely would entail production cuts of twice this size; in 
other words, equivalent to approximately a quarter of the cartel’s collective daily 
output� Cuts also would occur in an environment in which it would be uncertain 
when demand from OPEC Gulf producers’ cornerstone East Asian customers, 
foremost among them China, might recover�
China has been the key source of demand-side support for global oil prices 
over much of the past decade, accounting for roughly 43 percent of global in-
cremental oil-demand growth between 2009 and 2015�75 On the secondary, but 
directly linked, level, commodity demand in China, which would suffer badly 
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under a blockade, has had a multiplier effect on global raw-material demand 
and prices� Consider the oil market, for instance� The five regional groupings 
that account for the majority of commodity exports to China (the Middle East 
and North Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union, and 
sub-Saharan Africa) accounted for roughly 10�5 million barrels per day of oil-
products demand increase between 2000 and 2015—1�6 times the amount by 
which China’s own oil-products demand grew during that time�76 Much of this 
came as rising commodity prices stimulated by China’s growth meant larger 
export revenues that catalyzed economic growth and greater local oil demand in 
key commodity-exporting countries�
The significant long-term reduction in revenue to major oil and commodity 
exporters as a result of decreasing oil-demand volumes and depressed prices 
could exert profound internal political effects and trigger new conflicts and in-
flame existing ones across the Middle East and parts of Africa� Sufficiently seri-
ous regional contingencies could divert U�S� military resources from the Asian 
theater, particularly if the United States found itself politically and diplomatically 
Commodity 2015 Share of Global Consumption
Estimated Annual Global Export 
Market Size (2015), Billion USD Three Largest Exporter Countries
Crude oil 13%  739 Saudi Arabia, Russia, Canada
Steel 43%  277 Australia, Brazil, South Africaa
Natural gas  6%  244 Russia, Qatar, Norway
Copper 49%  155 Chile, Zambia, Russia
Soybeanb 30%  78 Brazil, USA, Argentina
Aluminum 53%  50 Russia, Canada, UAE
Wheat 16%  42 Canada, USA, Australia
Corn 22%  30 USA, Brazil, Argentina
Zinc 47%  20 Australia, Peru, South Korea
Nickel 53%  18 Russia, Australia, Canada
Lead 35%  16 Australia, Mexico, Peru
Total value 1,669
FIGURE 6
CHINA’S SHARE OF GLOBAL DEMAND FOR SELECT STRATEGIC, HIGHLY TRADED  
COMMODITIES IN 2015
Notes:  
UAE = United Arab Emirates; USD = U.S. dollars.
  Lead and zinc data include raw metal and ores and concentrates.
 a. Iron ore raw material exporters. 
 b. Soybeans and soybean meal. 
Sources: Bloomberg (steel price), industry associations, International Trade Administration (steel), Observatory of Economic Complexity (trade value), 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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isolated on the world stage� This could undermine the sustainability of a distant 
energy blockade against China�
Distant Blockade Signals U.S. Weakness?
Relying on blockade, especially a distant blockade, as a primary means of pros-
ecuting a conflict with China would risk signaling that the U�S� commitment to 
maintaining the Asian security architecture is, in fact, limited� Allies and the 
Chinese leadership alike likely would draw important conclusions from the 
message that U�S� actions transmitted� Regional partners might perceive a need 
to hedge their bets, while Beijing could conclude that if it held out long enough, 
Washington’s position and its resolve to prosecute the conflict would weaken, 
increasing the likelihood of a resolution that favored Chinese interests�
China Would Retain Its Military Hardware—and Still Pose a Challenge
One of the distant blockade’s chief points of attractiveness—its potential to re-
duce the belligerent parties’ direct kinetic actions against each other—is also a 
potential weakness because it leaves a defeated country with much of its antebel-
lum military capacity� As Evan Braden Montgomery of the Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) points out, a successful distant blockade that 
did not also include actions aimed at degrading China’s military would leave the 
United States struggling to “confront the challenge of reaching a sustainable ac-
cord with a defeated, potentially revanchist, and still militarily powerful China�”77 
In other words, victory today through a successful distant blockade might sow 
the seeds of a future conflict in which the blockaded party presumably would 
undertake great efforts to ensure it did not again suffer defeat by blockade�
Domestic Challenges from Powerful Commercial Interests
The broad deference the White House and powerful U�S� regulatory agencies 
such as the Departments of Justice and the Treasury showed to Wall Street dur-
ing and after the great financial crisis of 2008 raises unsettling questions for 
planners contemplating the domestic political dimensions of an energy blockade 
against China� Would these same offices and agencies—many of which would 
be involved intimately in implementing a blockade—truly be willing to injure 
influential private economic interests by effectively throttling the world’s second-
largest economy?
Multiple historical examples demonstrate that conflicting internal political 
priorities can impair a blockade’s strategic effectiveness severely� For instance, 
more than one year into its Beira patrol aimed at preventing oil shipments from 
reaching the rebellious colony of Rhodesia, Britain suffered major embarrass-
ment when a tanker entered the port of Beira even though an RN frigate had 
ordered it to stop and even had fired warning shots�78 In the context of a distant 
oil blockade against China, any hesitance to use force against noncompliant 
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vessels likely would encourage open defiance rapidly and induce an onslaught of 
Chinese-flagged ships trying to run the cordon� Instead, well-publicized use of 
disabling fire against noncompliant vessels in the early stages of a blockade would 
offer the best deterrent and substantially increase the blockade’s effectiveness 
and strategic value� But planners should not assume that civilian elected officials 
would be willing to allow the U�S� Navy broad tactical latitude to sink or disable 
vessels attempting to defy a blockade, particularly if these officials’ willingness to 
go “all in” on an oil blockade was attenuated by their desire to protect the com-
mercial interests of their private patrons�
This is especially true in the case of a “partial war,” among the most likely 
scenarios for a Sino-American kinetic conflict� In such a confrontation between 
nuclear powers, the overriding objective is to control escalation carefully rather 
than to pursue total military dominance�79 When civilian policy makers prioritize 
restraint over military effectiveness, it risks opening space for commercial inter-
ests to try to maintain to the maximum practicable extent their antebellum com-
mercial relationships� Internal political division invites attempts to circumvent 
an embargo� Nowhere would this be more apparent than in enforcement actions 
against confirmed—or, in particular, suspected—blockade-runners� Internal 
disunity likely would create conflicting or unclear rules of engagement and ham-
string on-scene commanders who must make important tactical decisions with 
substantial strategic consequences�
Perhaps the most prominent instance of domestic political discord undermin-
ing a blockade or economic-warfare campaign comes from Britain’s experience 
against Germany at the outset of World War I, between 1914 and 1916� Britain’s 
Admiralty enthusiastically promoted a full-bore assault on maritime trade bound 
for Germany, including that transiting through neutral ports, but it was stifled 
by a range of powerful diplomatic and commercial interests on the home front 
in Britain� As Nicholas A� Lambert noted in his groundbreaking historical ac-
count Planning Armageddon, the enduring lesson of Britain’s initial failure in 
its economic-warfare and blockade campaign against Germany was that, in the 
context of deeper global trade and financial linkages, “effective implementation 
of sea power was no longer simply a function of naval power but required the 
state to subordinate what might be termed the informal elements of maritime 
power (shipping, financial services, and communications)� But in seeking con-
trol over the infrastructure of the global trading system, the British state created 
enormous resistance by effectively compelling its nationals to act against their 
profit-maximizing instincts�”80
Britain ultimately did blockade Germany successfully, but getting to the point 
of an effective cordon took the better part of two years� If the time required for 
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Britain to impose an effective blockade against Germany transpired in a U�S-
China conflict scenario, Washington’s battle already might be lost� Under such a 
scenario, China would have shown the ability to execute an aggressive action and 
consolidate its gains while the United States dithered, then responded only belat-
edly because the core issues at stake mattered much more to China�
When assessing a potential military approach, one must appreciate its strengths, 
weaknesses, and inherent limits� An oil blockade is not itself a strategy; rather, 
it is an action appropriately subsumed into a larger economic, diplomatic, and 
military campaign� It is also an action that in physical, trade-warfare terms would 
be akin to a nuclear strike on the global economy� An open military conflict 
between the United States and China would be a globally cataclysmic event on 
many levels� Furthermore, physically interdicting one of the largest channels in 
the global oil trade—and with it, major parts of the Chinese economy—very 
likely would open a Pandora’s box of unforeseen secondary and tertiary adverse 
consequences whose effects could be worse than even the most pessimistic analy-
ses might suggest�
For this reason, properly understanding the issue and constructing and main-
taining an effective and sustainable security architecture designed to prevent such 
a conflict from ever coming to pass should be core U�S� national security priori-
ties� In this respect, continued advocacy on behalf of a blockade-centric approach 
(i�e�, offshore control) risks undermining U�S� strategic credibility in East Asia� 
Favoring a blockade-based deterrence policy goes in exactly the opposite direc-
tion by communicating that the U�S� political and military communities lack the 
will to engage in the intense conflict that may in fact be necessary to repel ter-
ritorial seizures and other actions aimed at undermining U�S� security guarantees 
and Washington’s standing in the eyes of its allies and others across Asia�
Treating a distant blockade as the centerpiece of Washington’s China-facing 
military stance also risks warping domestic procurement debates, with potential-
ly grave long-term strategic consequences� If a critical mass of Congress comes to 
believe that the Navy simply can close off China’s maritime oil arteries, members 
may become more reluctant to appropriate the hundreds of billions of dollars 
needed in coming decades to fund the personnel costs and hardware acquisitions 
needed to support and sustain a robust U�S� forward presence in Asia�
History strongly suggests that even if a potential foe appears vulnerable to 
over-the-horizon pressure on its seaborne commerce, a blockade never should 
be substituted for war or a campaign strategy� As U�S� policy makers contemplate 
options for potential conflict with China, they forget this lesson at their peril�
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   73 2/23/18   10:51 AM
25
Collins: A Maritime Oil Blockade Against China—Tactically Tempting but Str
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 7 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
  The opinions in this article are the author’s 
alone and do not reflect any views or posi-
tions of the Baker Institute for Public Policy 
or Rice University�
 1� The epigraph comes from Robert A� Doughty 
[Col�, USA] and Harold E� Raugh Jr� [Maj�, 
USA], “Embargoes in Historical Perspective,” 
Parameters 21, no� 1 (Spring 1991), p� 29�
 2� For a deterrence view, see Sean Mirski, 
“Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and 
Consequences of an American Naval Block-
ade of China,” Journal of Strategic Studies  
36, no� 3 (February 2013), available at  
carnegieendowment�org/� For a war- 
termination view, see T� X� Hammes, “Off-
shore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an 
Unlikely Conflict,” Strategic Forum, no� 278 
(June 2012), available at www�dtic�mil/�
 3� Gabriel B� Collins and William S� Murray, 
“No Oil for the Lamps of China?,” Naval War 
College Review 61, no� 2 (Spring 2008), p� 88, 
available at www�usnwc�edu/� In that analysis, 
and in this article, the idea of an “oil block-
ade” encompasses both crude oil and refined 
products�
 4� Sean Mirski advanced a detailed road map of 
ideas for filling tactical gaps pointed out by 
Collins and Murray� Douglas Peifer offers a 
shorter and more conclusory set of argu-
ments� Douglas C� Peifer, “China, the German 
Analogy, and the New AirSea Operational 
Concept,” Orbis 55, no� 1 (Winter 2011), pp� 
114–31�
 5� The author acknowledges that a physical oil 
blockade likely would be implemented in 
conjunction with financial coercion� Such 
financial measures would leverage the United 
States’ massive wealth; the U�S� dollar’s status 
as the de facto global reserve currency; and 
U�S� dominance of the global trading ap-
paratus, including banking infrastructure, 
settlement and clearance systems, and com-
munications networks� This analysis refrains 
from in-depth discussion of financial warfare 
for two primary reasons: (1) the scope and 
length of the study, and (2) because using 
financial weaponry against China would risk 
triggering unintended strategic consequences 
that, in many instances, likely would parallel 
fundamentally the blowback that a maritime 
oil blockade would unleash� Iran—the most 
recent victim of a U�S�-led financial-warfare 
campaign—is a marginal player in the global 
economy, but China would pose a very dif-
ferent set of challenges owing to its global 
systemic importance�
 6� This analysis purposely avoids the topic of 
a grain blockade� The reason is simple: a 
successful distant petroleum blockade in 
theory can help accomplish a “mission kill” 
by sapping an adversary’s national power 
and, if combined with strikes on oil-refining 
assets, can ground air forces and halt fossil 
fuel–powered shipping but does not starve 
a civilian population physically� Interdicting 
staple food supplies risks forcing a populace 
and its leaders into what is literally a survival 
situation, with all the attendant escalatory 
consequences that flow from such a state of 
affairs� The analysis uses the term petroleum 
because to succeed, such a blockade would 
need to interdict both crude oil and potential 
imports of refined products such as diesel 
fuel, gasoline, and jet fuel�
 7� See, for instance, Daniel Moran, “Stability 
Operations: The View from Afloat,” a chapter 
in Naval Peacekeeping and Humanitarian 
Operations: Stability from the Sea, ed� James J� 
Wirtz and Jeffrey A� Larsen (London: Rout-
ledge, 2009)�
 8� Peifer, “China, the German Analogy, and the 
New AirSea Operational Concept,” p� 127�
 9� Hammes, “Offshore Control,” p� 12�
 10� World Trade Organization, World Trade Re-
port 2013: Factors Shaping the Future of World 
Trade (Geneva: 2013), p� 50, available at www 
�wto�org/; Marc Levinson, U.S. Manufactur-
ing in International Perspective, CRS Report 
R42135 (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, January 18, 2017), available 
at digitalcommons�ilr�cornell�edu/�
 11� “Satellite Data Show China May Have Stored 
More Crude Than Estimated,” Bloomberg 
News, September 29, 2016, www�bloomberg 
�com/�
 12� Capitulation could encompass a range of pos-
sible outcomes� In a territorial dispute, it is 
difficult to envision a scenario in which Bei-
jing would cede occupied territory willingly�
N O T E S
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   74 2/23/18   10:51 AM
26
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/6
 C O L L I N S  7 5
 13� Collins and Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of 
China?,” p� 92�
 14� See, for instance, Eric Ng, “Woe to Oil: Why 
China’s 2017 Output Will Extend Record 
Decline,” South China Morning Post, January 
16, 2017, www�scmp�com/, and Gabe Collins, 
“China Peak Oil: 2015 Is the Year,” The Diplo-
mat, July 7, 2015, thediplomat�com/�
 15� Damon Evans, “Price Spikes Feared as Asian 
Oil Production Drops,” Nikkei Asian Review, 
March 29, 2017, asia�nikkei�com/�
 16� The force requirements for sustaining a dis-
tant blockade covering multiple choke points 
could pose significant opportunity costs, 
particularly if a conflict expands and addi-
tional platforms are needed for force-on-force 
engagements away from the distant-blockade 
area� Even if crews are rotated on and off 
forward-deployed ships to reduce steaming 
time between the vessels’ home ports and 
the blockade zone, ships still need periodic 
maintenance and replenishment� Data from 
the CSBA suggest that in a high-OPTEMPO 
scenario, forward-deployed ships could be 
deployed for six months out of a given twelve-
month period, meaning that at least two 
ships would be needed for each vessel slot in 
a blockade force� Bryan Clark et al�, Restoring 
American Seapower: A New Fleet Architecture 
for the United States Navy (Washington, DC: 
CSBA, 2017), p� 104, available at csbaonline 
�org/�
 17� “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” EIA, July 
25, 2017, www�eia�gov/�
 18� “Panama Canal Expansion Will Allow Transit 
of Larger Ships with Greater Volumes,” EIA, 
September 17, 2014, www�eia�gov/�
 19� Yimou Lee, Chen Aizhu, and Shwe Yee Saw 
Myint, “RPT—Beset by Delays, Myanmar–
China Oil Pipeline Nears Start-Up,” Reuters, 
March 21, 2017, af�reuters�com/�
 20� For a more detailed discussion of the vulner-
ability of the Myanmar–China pipeline and 
the oft-discussed proposed pipeline from 
Gwadar, Pakistan, to China, see Andrew S� 
Erickson and Gabriel B� Collins, “China’s Oil 
Security Pipe Dream: The Reality, and Stra-
tegic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports,” 
Naval War College Review 63, no� 2 (Spring 
2010), pp� 89–111, available at www�usnwc 
�edu/�
 21� Andrew Erickson and Gabriel Collins, 
“Beijing’s Energy Security Strategy: The Sig-
nificance of a Chinese State-Owned Tanker 
Fleet,” Orbis 51, no� 4 (December 2007), pp� 
665–84�
 22� See, for instance, “Tankers: China’s UNIPEC 
Top Dirty Tanker Charterer in 2016—Ship-
broker,” S&P Global Platts, January 11, 2017, 
www�platts�com/�
 23� Collins and Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of 
China?,” pp� 79–95�
 24� The first public discussion of navicerts in a 
China blockade context of which the author is 
aware comes from Mirski, “Stranglehold�”
 25� Malcolm Moos, “The Navicert in World War 
II,” American Journal of International Law 38, 
no� 1 (January 1944), pp� 115–19�
 26� Mirski, “Stranglehold�”
 27� For a detailed discussion of “forcible ration-
ing,” its administrative benefits, and an 
internal debate in Britain on the issue during 
World War I, see Nicholas A� Lambert, Plan-
ning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare 
and the First World War (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Univ� Press, 2012), pp� 468–69�
 28� For a historical example, consider the Allies’ 
stationing of expert observers at petroleum 
installations in Spain during World War II 
to try to prevent oil products from being 
diverted to Nazi Germany� Leonard Caruana 
and Hugh Rockoff, “An Elephant in the Gar-
den: The Allies, Spain, and Oil in World War 
II,” European Review of Economic History 11, 
no� 2 (August 2007), pp� 159–87�
 29� The navicert framework suggested purposely 
excludes Rosneft’s Komsomolsk refinery 
and the company’s proposed facility near 
Vladivostok, for two reasons� First, these 
plants are intended to use Russian crude oil, 
not imports� Second, any “imports” ostensi-
bly bound for these plants (1) would allow 
diversion of additional Russian oil supplies to 
northern China, or (2) themselves would be 
diverted into the Chinese market, or (3) both�
 30� Mirski, “Stranglehold�”
 31� There is the vital caveat that U�S� oil-product 
rationing in that conflict was necessitated by 
the need to redirect resources to war produc-
tion at home and military campaigns and 
was not an act of survival precipitated by an 
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   75 2/23/18   10:51 AM
27
Collins: A Maritime Oil Blockade Against China—Tactically Tempting but Str
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 7 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
external power physically severing American 
petroleum supply lines�
 32� Bradley Flamm, “Putting the Brakes on ‘Non-
essential’ Travel: 1940s Wartime Mobility, 
Prosperity, and the U�S� Office of Defense,” 
Journal of Transport History 27, no� 1 (March 
2006), p� 87�
 33� Ibid�
 34� Regarding vehicle numbers, see “State Motor 
Vehicle Registrations, by Years, 1900–1995,” 
Federal Highway Administration, www�fhwa 
�dot�gov�/; for the U�S� population in 1940, see 
“A Look at the 1940 Census,” United States 
Census Bureau, www�census�gov/; for Chinese 
automobile fleet and population data, see 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, data 
�stats�gov�cn/�
 35� Wealthier drivers can evade such restric-
tions by owning multiple vehicles and license 
plates, but even with such adaptations the 
idea that the government can restrict car 
usage arbitrarily is already much more deeply 
ingrained in driver psyches than it was in the 
United States even as early as 1941�
 36� “Oil Market Report,” International Energy 
Agency, March 15, 2017, www�iea�org/�
 37� Gabriel Collins and Andrew Erickson, 
“Where China’s Diesel Fuel Exports Are 
Coming from and Where They Are Going,” 
China SignPost, November 14, 2016, www 
�chinasignpost�com/�
 38� Sohbet Karbuz, “US Military Energy  
Consumption—Facts and Figures,” Sohbet 
Karbuz (blog), May 20, 2007, karbuz�blogspot 
�com/�
 39� UP data for 2015 show 927�677 billion gross 
ton-miles / 1,064 million gallons (gal) of fuel 
consumed = 872 gross ton-miles per gallon; 
and (112 kbd of fuel [5 percent of estimated 
diesel consumption by heavy trucks in China] 
× 365 days per year × 42 gal per barrel [bbl] 
= 1,716 million gal of fuel) × 872 gross 
ton-miles per gallon = ~1�5 trillion gross ton-
miles� UP data sourced from the 2015 Annual 
Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the  
Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Union Pa-
cific Corporation, available at www�up�com/�
 40� “National Data (Transport → Freight Ton- 
Kilometers),” National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, data�stats�gov�cn/�
 41� Truck-based overland oil shipment is much 
more expensive per unit than moving crude 
or products by pipeline, but hard-pressed 
regimes have used the technique to move 
significant volumes of petroleum goods� For 
instance, Clinton administration officials 
estimated that in the late 1990s Iraqi interests 
were smuggling fifty to sixty thousand barrels 
per day of crude oil and refined products by 
truck from northern Iraq into Turkey� James 
Risen, “Iraq Is Smuggling Oil to the Turks 
under Gaze of U�S�,” New York Times, June 19, 
1998, www�nytimes�com/�
 42� “About the Company,” KCP, www�kcp�kz/�
 43� Data for the quantity of oil China imports 
from Kazakhstan come from China General 
Administration of Customs, cited by Bloom-
berg, www�bloomberg�com/�
 44� “Сковородино–граница КНР”  
[Skovorodino–Chinese Border Pipeline], 
Transneft—Realized Projects, www�transneft 
�ru/�
 45� “Расширение пропускной способности 
нефтепровода «Сковородино–Мохэ»” 
[Capacity Expansion of Skovorodino–Mohe 
Pipeline], Transneft—Current Projects, www 
�transneft�ru/�
 46� “Myanmar–China Crude Pipeline Officially 
Put into Operation,” CNPC, April 11, 2017, 
www�cnpc�com�cn/�
 47� Андрей Зуев [Andrei Zuev], “Труба на 
смену рельсам” [Switching Rails for Pipe-
line], Central Dispatching Agency of Russian 
Fuel and Energy Complex (CDU-TEK), www 
�cdu�ru/�
 48� Valery Shpakov and Alexander Shenets, “Full 
Year 2016 Results,” Globaltrans, April 3, 2017, 
www�globaltrans�com/�
 49� “Movements of Crude Oil and Selected 
Proucts by Rail,” EIA, www�eia�gov/; Robert E� 
Pickel Jr�, “North American Car Fleet: Trends” 
(presentation to the North East Association of 
Rail Shippers, Philadelphia, PA, October 16, 
2015), available at www�nears�org/�
 50� “Movements of Crude Oil and Selected Prod-
ucts by Rail�”
 51� “Расширение трубопроводной системы 
«Восточная Сибирь–Тихий океан» на 
участке Тайшет–Сковородино до 58 млн� 
тонн нефти в год” [Expansion of Eastern 
Siberia–Pacific Ocean Pipeline System Aims 
for a Capacity of 58 Million Tonnes per Year], 
Transneft, www�transneft�ru/�
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   76 2/23/18   10:51 AM
28
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/6
 C O L L I N S  7 7
 52�  “Сковородино–граница КНР”  
[Skovorodino–Chinese Border Pipeline], 
Transneft—Recently Completed Projects, www 
�transneft�ru/; “Second China–Russia Crude 
Oil Pipeline Project Completed,” Asia Times, 
November 14, 2017, www�atimes�com/�
 53� “Расширение трубопроводной системы 
«Восточная Сибирь–Тихий океан»  
Реконструкция магистральных нефте-
проводов Западной Сибири” [Expansion 
of Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean Pipeline 
System and Modernization of Oil Trunk Pipe-
lines in Western Siberia], Transneft, www 
�transneft�ru/about/�
 54�  From the author’s database of Chinese 
pipeline-construction projects, available on 
request�
 55� Ibid�
 56� “Big Inch Pipelines of WWII,” American Oil 
& Gas Historical Society, aoghs�org/�
 57� 1,000 km / 6 km/d�
 58� For Chinese methanol production and 
feedstock-type data, see Anu Agarwal, “De-
velopments in China’s Methanol Market  
and Implications for Global Supply,” Argus, 
May 8, 2015, www�argusmedia�com/� There 
are approximately 333 gallons of methanol 
per metric ton, meaning that one ton of 
methanol is volumetrically equivalent to  
7�92 barrels� “Methanol FAQs,” SCC, www 
�southernchemical�com/�
 59� See, for instance, “Shenhua Baotou Coal 
Chemical Company Announces the Accep-
tance of the World’s Largest Methanol Plant,” 
Johnson Matthey, June 16, 2012, www 
�jmprotech�com/�
 60� Methanol Institute, Methanol Use in Gasoline: 
Blending, Storage and Handling of Gasoline 
Containing Methanol (Singapore: June 2016), 
available at www�methanol�org/�
 61� “Methanex Investor Presentation,” Methanex, 
March–April 2017, www�methanex�com/; 
“China’s Use of Methanol in Liquid Fuels Has 
Grown Rapidly since 2000,” EIA, February 23, 
2017, www�eia�gov/�
 62� Anton Ferkov, China’s CTO/MTO Boom 
(London: S&P Global Platts, January 2016), 
available at www�platts�com/�
 63� CCF Group, “China’s Methanol Availability 
in 2016 and Forecast in 2017,” IGP Methanol, 
January 18, 2017, igpmethanol�com/�
 64� Agarwal, “Developments in China’s Methanol 
Market and Implications for Global Supply�”
 65� Ibid�
 66� “Fuel Properties Comparison,” Alternative 
Fuels Data Center, October 29, 2014, www 
�afdc�energy�gov/� Calculation: 3,000 kbd of 
gasoline demand × 65 percent [reflects 35 
percent demand reduction from rationing]  
× 15 percent of total remaining gasoline pool 
× 2 bbl of methanol per bbl of gasoline = 585 
kbd of methanol�
 67� China already blends more than 400 kbd of 
methanol and methanol derivatives into its 
gasoline supply� See, for instance, “China’s 
Use of Methanol in Liquid Fuels Has Grown 
Rapidly since 2000�” The proportion of 
methanol likely would rise under wartime 
conditions, but not without challenges� For 
example, methanol can cause serious corro-
sion of certain polymers and metals, such as 
aluminum, that are used in many engine and 
fuel supply–system components in cars, but 
can be offset by remedial additives� “Metha-
nol as a Gasoline Blending Component,” 
ACEA Position Paper, European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association, October 2015, 
available at www�acea�be/�
 68� T� F� Yusaf et al�, “The Effect of Methanol- 
Diesel Blended Ratio on CI Engine Perfor-
mance,” International Journal of Automotive 
and Mechanical Engineering 8, no� 1 (Decem-
ber 2013), pp� 1385–95�
 69� The estimate of seven hundred million 
barrels ultimately may prove conservative� 
It is drawn from an estimate of six hundred 
million barrels of crude in storage in China’s 
aboveground tanks at the end of 2014 and 
underground storage caverns at Huangdao, 
Jinzhou, Zhanjiang, Huizhou, and one other 
location that are slated to hold 130 million 
barrels of crude by 2020� “Satellite Data Show 
China May Have Stored More Crude Than 
Estimated,” Bloomberg News, September 29, 
2016, www�bloomberg�com/; Meng Meng and 
Chen Aizhu, “China Goes Underground to 
Expand Its Strategic Oil Reserves,” Reuters, 
January 6, 2016, www�reuters�com/�
 70� Lu Wang and Michelle Leung, “China Coal to 
Liquids’ Outlook Dimmed,” Bloomberg Intel-
ligence, October 19, 2016, www�bloomberg 
�com/� Diesel fuel conversion factor of 7�5 bbl 
per ton obtained from “Conversion Calcula-
tor,” CME Group, www�cmegroup�com/�
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   77 2/23/18   10:51 AM
29
Collins: A Maritime Oil Blockade Against China—Tactically Tempting but Str
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 7 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
 71� Consider that in fiscal year 2004 the U�S� 
military used approximately 395,000 bpd of 
oil to fight wars simultaneously in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; sustain multiple global deploy-
ments; and conduct intensive ground, air, and 
naval training exercises�
 72� For global oil supply and demand data, see 
“Annual Statistical Supplement,” 2016 ed�, 
International Energy Agency, www�iea�org/�
 73� “151st (Extraordinary) Meeting of the OPEC 
Conference,” Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, December 17, 2008, 
www�opec�org/; “Oil Market Report,” IEA, 
October 2008, www�iea�org/�
 74� For oil price data, see “NYMEX Futures 
Prices,” EIA, www�eia�gov/�
 75� Gabriel Collins, China’s Evolving Oil Demand: 
Slowing Overall Growth, Gasoline Replacing 
Diesel as Demand Driver, Refined Product 
Exports Rising Substantially, Baker Institute 
for Public Policy Working Paper (Houston, 
TX: Rice University—Baker Institute, 2016), 
available at www�scholarship�rice�edu/�
 76� Ibid�
 77� Evan Braden Montgomery, “Reconsidering 
a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to 
Mirski,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no� 4 
(2013), pp� 615–23�
 78� Richard Mobley, “The Beira Patrol: Britain’s 
Broken Blockade against Rhodesia,” Naval 
War College Review 55, no� 1 (Winter 2002), 
pp� 63–84�
 79� In the case of a total war—such as the British 
campaign against Germany between 1916 and 
1918 or the U�S� blockade of Japan in World 
War II—private financial interests clearly 
are subordinated to the national interest and 
national strategic goals�
 80� Lambert, Planning Armageddon, p� 500�
NWC_Spring2018Review.indb   78 2/23/18   10:51 AM
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/6
